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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2-
2(3)0) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^] "2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) 
and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any matter over 
which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing 
to assert rights based on the June 26, 1975 contract between Bell Mountain Corporation and 
Sandy City and dismissing Plaintiffs claims following a two-day trial. 
Standard of Review: A determination of standing is generally a question of law 
which the Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 
P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether, if the Plaintiffs were not parties to the agreement, they were 
intended third-party beneficiaries to the agreement and entitled to enforce the agreement. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
2
 Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)0') (1953, as amended). 
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Standard of Review: Whether a third-party beneficiary' status exists is determined 
by examining a written contract and is reviewed for correctness. Am. Towers Owners Assoc, 
Inc. v. CCIMeck, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). 
3. What significance should be given to the course of dealing between the 
parties (which shows that before any dispute arose both Plaintiffs and Sandy City interpreted 
the agreement to waive flood control fees and lA of the park fees) in interpreting the meaning 
of the agreement here. 
Standard of Review: Whether a contractual term or provision is ambiguous on 
its face is a question of law. Dairies v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269, 1275-76 (Utah 2008). Once 
the court determines that the term or provision is facially ambiguous, it may determine the 
parties' intent through examination of parol evidence, the determination of which presents 
a question of fact. Id. ffif 25-26. "In reviewing a trial court's contract interpretation, we defer 
to the trial court on questions of fact but not on questions of law." Peterson v. Sunrider 
Corp., 2002 UT 43, If 14, 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to interpret the contract in 
accordance with established principals of contract interpretation, including contra 
proferentem. 
Standard of Review: We review a district court's interpretation of a written 
contract for correctness, granting no deference to the court below. Home Sav. & Loan v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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5. Whether the trial court erred in creating and imposing a time limit upon 
the "winding up" of a corporation, where no such time limit has been statutorily adopted. 
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law. 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999). Therefore, "we accord no 
deference to the legal conclusions of the district court but review them for correctness." Id. 
6. Whether the trial court erred by failing to find that Plaintiffs have 
standing to enforce the agreement, because the agreement runs with the land. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing the trial court's interpretation of the 
contract, which presents a legal question, this court reviews for correctness. Fairbourn 
Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 294 (Utah 2004). 
RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. 16-10a-1405. Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their 
interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve 
may provide for closing the corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those 
prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; 
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(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers 
or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its 
corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the 
effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This appeal seeks the reversal of Judge Royal Hansen's decision, following a two-day 
trial, that Plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce a contract from June 26,1975 (1975 Contract) 
between Bell Mountain Corporation (Bell Mountain), Horman properties and Sandy City 
regarding the development of the Pepperwood residential subdivisions. Plaintiffs/Appellants 
are the incorporators, owners, assigns and successors in interest to Bell Mountain who 
developed the "Horman properties." 
In 1970, the Horman family purchased nearly 1000 acres of land in Salt Lake County, 
then adjoining Sandy City and later incorporated into Sandy City, for the purpose of annexing 
into Sandy City and creating a residential subdivision development. Pursuant to a written 
agreement dated June 26, 1975, Bell Mountain agreed to finance, design and construct a 
three million gallon underground reservoir and other water system improvements for Sandy 
City to allow development to continue. At the time, Sandy was considering a moratorium 
on all development because they had insufficient culinary water. The 1975 Contract 
provided that the Homian family would receive partial reimbursement over a ten year period 
for the cost of the reservoir construction, and most importantly, the waiver of the City's newly 
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adopted ordinances requiring developers to pay flood fees, park fees and water connection 
fees over the life of the development of the Horman family property. 
The 1975 Contract provided the Horman family would assign their valuable water 
rights, well and land back to the City, which they did. Following the 1975 Contract, the 
Horman family continued their development. The water rights and well surrendered by the 
Hormans in the 1975 Contract are worth tens of millions of dollars. 
For decades following the 1975 Contract, Plaintiffs continued to develop the Homian 
family property in phases of the Pepperwood development, using a variety of entities, 
corporations, LLC's and proprietorships. Sandy honored the 1975 Contract in dealing with 
the Homian family, long after Bell Mountain Corporation ceased to exist. 
Within the last few years, however, Sandy City enacted substantially increased flood 
control fees and began to violate the 1975 Contract by charging the Harmon family entities 
the flood control fee and requiring payment of the full park fee. 
This dispute arises from the recent change in Sandy's position, requiring payment of 
over one-and-a-half-million dollars in flood control fees plus park fees from the Horman 
family entities and their buyers, which fees were expressly waived in the 1975 Contract. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants sued Sandy City, alleging four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; 
(2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Conversion; and (4) 
Declaratory Judgment. 
After a two-day bench trial, Judge Royal Hansen determined that Plaintiffs/Appellants 
did not have standing to enforce the terms of the 1975 Contract, and dismissed all of 
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Plaintiffs' claims. The issue of Plaintiffs' standing had been raised three previous times in 
these proceedings by Sandy City. Each time, the court denied the City's motions to dismiss 
and/or for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs' lack of standing. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 7,2005. A motion to dismiss was filed 
by Sandy City on October 17, 2005, on grounds and for the reason that "Plaintiffs do not 
have standing to bring this action, do not own the claims they assert, and have failed to plead 
adequate facts to establish ownership of the claims they assert." (Court Record (hereinafter 
designated as "R."), 63-83, Motion to Dismiss, dated October 17, 2005.) 
The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Christiansen on January 9,2006. In ruling 
on the motion to dismiss, the court stated that, based on the pleadings and relevant case 
precedent, it "must assume ... Plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the 1975 Agreement. 
How, why, when or even if they actually attained such status can be determined through 
discovery . . . . Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing to sue to protect their interests under 
the June 25,1975 Agreement with Sandy City[.]" (R. 207-209, Order dated January 9,2006 
by Judge Terry L. Christiansen.) 
Following extensive discovery, Sandy City moved for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that the 1975 agreement "(1) is not a covenant running with the land; (2) has not been 
validly assigned to the plaintiffs; and (3) none of the plaintiffs are parties to the agreement, 
thus precluding any enforceable rights on which to base their claim." (R. 234-302, Motion 
dated October 13,2006.) The Horman family responded that the 1975 Contract was properly 
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assigned to Plaintiffs; the 1975 Contract remains in effect; and, the 1975 Contract runs with 
the land. (R. 306-692, Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated November 8, 2006.) 
On May 23, 2007, following oral argument, the court denied summary judgment, 
finding issues of fact remain as to the reasonable time for winding up the affairs of Bell 
Mountain, the meaning of paragraph 12 of the 1975 Agreement, and whether the contractual 
provisions "run with the land". (R. 761-763, Order on Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment, dated May 23, 2007.) 
Trial was held on October 21-22, 2008, with a closing argument on December 10, 
2008. Following trial, the court asked for submissions of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Rather than use the form of findings and conclusions submitted by the parties, the 
court relied on its own findings and conclusions. The court found the 1975 Contract was 
entered into by Bell Mountain and Sandy City. (R. 1117-1130, ^ 1, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated January 27,2009.) The court found the 1975 Contract 
to be binding on both parties, their successors and assigns. {Id, f 6.) However, the court 
concluded Plaintiffs were not assignees of Bell Mountain nor third party beneficiaries under 
the 1975 Contract. {Id, at ffljl 8-20.) The court also concluded the 1975 Contract did not run 
with the land. {Id. at^21.) 
Based on its conclusions, the court then held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce 
the 1975 Contract. (Id. at 122.) 
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Statement of Facts with Reference to the District Court Record 
1. In 1970, the Horman family purchased nearly 1000 acres of land in Salt Lake 
County, which was known to Sandy from that time forward as "Horman properties3." (R. 
1464, Trial Transcript ("Tr."), p. 13, Ins. 23-24; p. 14, Ins. 16-18; p. 16, Ins. 21-25; R. 1464, 
Tr., p. 387, Ins, 15-24; p. 390, Ins. 17-23; see also Trial Exhibit 138; Trial Exhibit 139.) 
2. The Horman family members owning the property planned to develop it into 
a subdivision and explored annexing it into Sandy. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 16, Ins. 13-15; R. 1465, 
Tr., p. 259, Ins. 19-25; p. 260, Ins. 1-23.) 
3. Prior to annexation, Sandy required culinary water to be available to the 
Horman properties, as the existing water companies and their assets were not sufficient to 
service the proposed subdivision. The Horman family had valuable water rights and 
proposed to use their water rights to create a water company to service their land. (R. 1464, 
Tr., p. 15, Ins. 13-23; R. 1465, Tr., p. 269, Ins. 2-8.) 
4. After showing the feasibility of a new water company, Sandy allowed the land 
to be annexed. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 16, Ins. 13-20.) 
5. When annexed, the property began to be known as the f,Pepperwood,f area. 
This was the anticipated name to be used for the anticipated subdivision development. (R. 
3
 The property is described in various Sandy City documents, including the 1975 
Contract, as follows: "Hormanproperties located east of 2000 east [sic], north of 12000 south 
[sic] and south of 10000 south [sic]." See Exhibit 6(C). This description was authored by 
Sandy City. (R). 1464, Tr., p. 40, Ins. 1-23.) Within the area bounded by 20th East, 120th 
South and 100th South, the approximate 1,000 acres belonging to the Horman family was 
wholly located. (R). 1464, Tr, p. 14,1ns. 16-26; p. 15,1ns. 1-3; R. 1465, Tr, p. 266, Ins. 17-
25; p. 267, Ins. 1-3; see also Trial Exhibit 41.) 
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1464, Tr, p. 17, Ins. 2-12; R. 1465, Tr, p. 259, Ins. 4-23; p. 262, Ins. 8-11; p. 321, Ins. 4-14; 
see also Trial Exhibit 139.) 
6. The first portion of the Horman properties was annexed into Sandy in 1972. 
(R. 1464, Tr., p. 19,1ns. 3-8.) 
7. By 1974, the Hormans had recorded two phases of their Pepperwood 
development containing 141 lots (of which most had been sold), three water wells had been 
drilled, a pump ordered, construction on a reservoir commenced and several miles of water 
lines installed. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 20, Ins. 1-25; p. 21, Ins. 1-25; see also Trial Exhibit 2.) 
8. Shortly after the initial work was done, Sandy City passed an ordinance which 
prohibited any water company, other than Sandy, to make new connections within the City. 
(R. 1464, Tr., p. 22, Ins. 6-20; see also Trial Exhibit 8.) 
9. This ordinance specifically targeted the Horman family water rights. (R. 1464, 
Tr., p. 22, Ins. 9-20.) The family water rights were much more valuable than the property. 
(R. 1464, Tr., p. 25, Ins. 2-7; R. 1465, Tr, p. 270, Ins. 12-25.) 
10. As a result, the Horman family had no reasonable alternative but to enter into 
an agreement dated May 31, 1974 (referred to herein as "1974 Contract") with Sandy. (R. 
1464, Tr, p. 26, Ins. 7-20; R. 1465, Tr, p. 271, Ins. 1-20; see also Trial Exhibit 9.) 
11. The 1974 Contract was signed by Charles Horman on behalf of the entity "S. 
M. Horman & Sons Company,1' a Utah partnership. (R. 1464, Tr, p. 25, Ins. 8-17; see Trial 
Exhibit 9.) 
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12. The 1974 Contract required the Horman family to turn over all water rights, 
pipe lines and operating well to the City, including the land on which the well was located. 
(R. 1464, Tr, p. 28, Ins. 13-25; p. 29, Ins. 1-5; see Trial Exhibit 9.) 
13. The consideration paid by Sandy to the Hormans was only a small fraction of 
the value of the water infrastructure transferred; however, the ability to proceed with 
development of their land without litigation motivated the Horman family to enter into the 
1974 Contract. (R. 1464, Tr, p. 24, Ins. 6-25; p. 25, Ins. 1-7; p. 26, Ins. 6-20.; see Trial 
Exhibit 8.) 
14. The 1974 Contract contemplated that the City would meet the requirements 
mandated by the Board of Health, which included adequate water pressure and fire protection 
flow rates. This, however, would require the construction of a storage reservoir. (R. 1464, 
Tr, p. 28, Ins. 13-25; p. 29, Ins. 6-19; R. 1465, Tr, p. 271, Ins. 4-25; see Trial Exhibit 9.) 
15. By early 1975, Sandy City's water system was not in compliance with the 
requirements of the Board of Health because the City had failed to construct a reservoir 
which would provide adequate fire protection flow rates and water pressure. (R. 1464, Tr, 
p. 32, Ins. 18-25; p. 33, Ins. 1-25; R. 1465, Tr, p. 271, Ins. 4-25.) 
16. Consequently, Sandy City passed a moratorium which prohibited any new 
home construction or lot development on the Horman properties. The failure to provide 
water and adoption of the moratorium created a default under the 1974 Contract. (R. 
1464, Tr., p. 32, Ins. 18-25; p. 33, Ins. 1-25; p. 34, Ins. 1-6; see Trial Exhibit 10,p.2.) 
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17. In early 1975, Sandy City also passed an ordinance concerning development 
fees to be assessed by the Sandy City engineer for flood control drainage and maintenance, 
and provided that the fees would be collected from the developers in advance. Collection 
in advance was motivated by Sandy City's then-existing financial problems. (See Trial 
Exhibit 11.) 
18. Sandy City acknowledged the default under the 1974 Contract, but represented 
to the Horman family that they intended to build a reservoir. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 33,1ns. 10-15.) 
However, since it only served a small area and would be expensive, the new reservoir was 
a low priority and had not yet been budgeted by Sandy. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 33, Ins. 15-17.) 
19. In an effort to solve the water problems for Sandy City and to continue their 
development, the Horman family offered to build a reservoir for Sandy. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 33, 
Ins. 18-25; R. 1465, Tr., p. 271, Ins. 8-25; p. 272, Ins. 1-3.) 
20. On June 25,1975 the Horman family contracted with Sandy City to solve the 
construction moratorium, rather than pursuing lengthy litigation for the default under the 
1974 Contract. (R. 1464, Tr., p. 55, Ins. 9-23; R. 1465, Tr, p. 295, Ins. 17-24.) 
21. The Sandy City Council proposed the terms of the 1975 Contract, which is set 
forth in the Sandy City Council minutes. (See Trial Exhibit 10.) 
22. The language of the 1975 Contract was taken directly from the minutes of the 
Sandy City Council meeting. (See Trial Exhibit 6(C); Trial Exhibit 10.) 
23. The Sandy City Council minutes state Sandy City would agree to "Defer all 
water connection and associated water charges of the Bell Mountain Corp. and Horman 
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properties located east of 2000 East, north of 12000 South and south of 10000 South until 
water is required by the individual lot owners." (See Trial Exhibit 10, emphasis added). 
24. The Sandy City Council approved the agreement and proposed that the Mayor, 
then Dewey Bluth, sign the agreement on behalf of Sandy City. (See Trial Exhibit 6(C); Trial 
Exhibit 10.) 
25. The 1975 Contract was signed by Charles Horman on behalf of "Bell Mountain 
Corporation" and refers to "Horman properties" as well as "successors and assigns." (See 
Trial Exhibit 6(C).) 
26. Under the 1975 Contract, the Bell Mountain agreed to finance, design and 
construct a three million gallon underground reservoir for Sandy. (See Trial Exhibit 6(C), 
1111 1-2.) 
27. The 1975 Contract also provided that Bell Mountain would receive some 
reimbursement over a ten year period for the cost of the reservoir construction, as well as the 
waiver of the newly passed ordinances requiring developers to pay flood fees, park fees and 
water connection fees over the life of the development of the Horman properties. (See 
Trial Exhibit 6(C), \\ 9-12; see Trial Exhibit 13; Trial Exhibit 14.) 
28. The 1975 Contract provided that the undeveloped portion of the Pepperwood 
Subdivision area would be exempt from paying Sandy initial flood control fees and one half 
of Sandy required park fees in exchange for Bell Mountain constructing water storage 
improvements for the benefit of Sandy. (R. 1464, p. 39,1ns. 1-25; p. 40, Ins. 1-14; p. 42, Ins. 
12-24; p. 70, Ins. 7-25; p. 71, Ins. 1-3; R. 1465, p. 259, Ins. 4-18; see Exhibit 6(C). 
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29. In reliance on the terms of the 1975 Contract, Bell Mountain provided water 
storage improvements to Sandy, which included a three million (3,000,000) gallon 
underground concrete water reservoir, and drilling several wells in the vicinity of the 
Pepperwood Subdivision. (R. 1464, p. 28, Ins. 13-24; p. 53, Ins. 9-19; p. 87, Ins. 1-7; p. 93, 
Ins. 8-24; see Exhibit 6(C).) 
30. The 1975 Contract also provided the Horman family would assign their 
valuable water rights, well and land back to the City. (R. 1465, Tr., p. 273, Ins. 2-15; 
see Trial Exhibit 6(C), 1 18(1).) 
31. The Horman family also received the ability to continue their development 
under the 1975 Contract. (R. 1464, p. 35, Ins. 18-24; see Exhibit 6(C).) 
32. The water rights and well given up by the Hormans in the 1975 Contract are 
worth millions of dollars. (R. 1464, p. 25, Ins. 4-7; R. 1465, p. 295, Ins. 1-14.) 
33. For decades following the 1975 Contract, the Hormans continued to develop 
the Horman properties in phases of the Pepperwood development, using a variety of entities, 
corporations, LLCs and proprietorships. (R. 1464, p. 206, Ins. 13-25; p. 207, Ins. 1-25; p. 
208,1ns. 1-11.) 
34. From 1975 until only recently, Sandy City's practice was not to charge the 
Horman properties for either flood maintenance fees or flood control basin fees, consistent 
with the 1975 Contract's requirements. (R. 1465, p. 402, Ins. 4-25; p. 403, Ins. 1-25; p. 404, 
Ins. 1-6; see Exhibit 21.) 
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35. Sandy honored the 1975 Contract long after Bell Mountain Corporation ceased 
to operate. (R. 1464, p. 87, Ins. 16-22.) 
36. From 1975 until just recently, Sandy has honored the 1975 Contract. Only 
recently has Sandy wrongly imposed and collected flood control fees and/or park fees on 
Phases 10A, 10B, IOC, 10D, 11B, Pepperwood Terrace 2 and Pepperwood Creek, while 
development in the area was continuing, totaling approximately $404,067.57 at the time 
of trial. (R. 1464, p. 87, Ins. 12-22; p. 236, Ins. 7-10; R. 1465, p. 281, Ins. 11-21; see 
Exhibit 1; Exhibit 5; Exhibit 6(A); Exhibit 6(C).) 
37. The 1975 Contract provided Sandy City with water rights that are extremely 
valuable and worth far more than the value of the Horman properties. (R. 1464, p. 15, Ins. 
21-23; p. 25, Ins. 2-7; p. 104, Ins. 7-25; R. 1465, p. 270, Ins. 12-25; p. 274, Ins. 2-5; see 
Exhibit 23.) 
38. Sandy City's breach of the 1975 Contract has resulted in the payment of over 
one million dollars in flood control fees plus park fees from the Horman family entities and 
their buyers which were waived in the 1975 Contract. (R. 1464, p. 104, Ins. 7-25; R. 1465, 
p. 281, Ins. 11-21; see Exhibit 23.) 
39. Since 1975, Sandy City has received from the Horman family entities the 3 
million gallon water tank, a productive water well, and the water rights associated with two 
wells. For over 30 years Sandy has benefitted from these water rights. They have sold water 
from the water system to residents throughout the eastern portion of Sandy both within the 
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Horman properties and to surrounding properties owned by others. (R. 1464, p. 86, Ins. 23-
25; p. 87,1ns. 1-11; p. 105,1ns. 15-25; p. 106,1ns. 1-10; see Exhibit 29.) 
40. The area known as Pepperwood Subdivision is still not fully developed. 
Development began in 1973 and continues today. (R. 1464, p. 87, Ins. 12-15.) 
41. In 1975, Bell Mountain Corporation was a Utah corporation. (R. 1464, p. 13, 
Ins. 15-21.) 
42. From 1975 to 1993, Bell Mountain Corporation was a corporate entity used by 
the Horman family to develop land owned by the Horman Family in the area known as the 
Pepperwood section of Sandy. (R. 1464, p. 13, Ins. 22-25; p. 14, Ins. 1-20.) 
43. Changes in tax and corporate laws made it advantageous to transfer 
development and sell portions of the property to separate Horman family entities, and to take 
advantage of these tax laws and secure long-term capital gains treatment for some of the 
revenues, title to the Horman properties was transferred to various family owned entities, 
which are the named Plaintiffs in this case. (R. 1464, p. 163, Ins 10-25; p. 164, Ins. 1-8.) 
44. In 1987, Bell Mountain transferred by Warranty Deed to Longview 
Development, a Utah corporation, all right title and interest in the Horman properties. {See 
Trial Exhibit 37 (B)-(G).) 
45. Bell Mountain closed operations in 1987, its last corporate income tax return 
was filed in 1987. (R. 1123, f 11.) 
46. On November 1, 1993, Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved by the 
Utah Department of Commerce. (R. 1464, p. 164, Ins. 9-25; see Trial Exhibit 32.) 
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47. On January 1, 1993, Long View Development passed title to its properties 
within the Pepperwood Subdivision to other Horman family entities, which are the 
Plaintiffs in this case. (R. 1464, p. 76, Ins. 13-25; p. 77, Ins. 1-12; see Trial Exhibit 25; 
Trial Exhibit 32; Trial Exhibit 102.) 
48. Although it had been done earlier, out of an abundance of caution, on 
November 8, 2005, Bell Mountain Corporation assigned again in writing its interest in the 
1975 Contract to Plaintiffs as a valid winding up of its business affairs as allowed by the 
corporate statute governing the dissolution of a corporation. (R. 1464, p. 166, Ins. 19-25; 
p. 167, Ins. 1-6; see Trial Exhibit 25.) 
49. Plaintiffs are successors in interest, intended third party beneficiaries, and 
property owners described as "Horman properties" with respect to Bell Mountain under 
the 1975 Contract with Sandy. (R. 1464, p. 206, Ins. 6-25; p. 207, Ins. 1-25; p. 208, Ins. 
1-21; see Trial Exhibit 25; Trial Exhibit 142, \ 16.) 
50. Before deciding to breach the Contract and collect money from Plaintiffs, 
Sandy City referred to the June 25, 1975 agreement as "between the City and Bell 
Mountain Corporation, the developer's (Legacy Development) predecessor in interest," 
clearly admitting Legacy Development is a successor in interest to Bell Mountain. (See 
Trial Exhibit 142, 116.) 
51. For many years after Bell Mountain ceased operations, Sandy City 
acknowledged the successor status of Plaintiffs and allowed Plaintiffs to receive the 
benefits of the 1975 Contract. (See Trial Exhibit 142, f 16.) 
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52. Sandy City upheld the terms of the Agreement for more than 20 years, even 
though the names of the entities developing the property changed. (R. 1464, p. 208, Ins. 
22-25; p. 209, Ins. 1-2; see Trial Exhibit 6(C); Trial Exhibit 142, 516.) 
53. Sandy waived the majority of fees after the assignment to Longview 
Development. {See Trial Exhibit 6(C); Trial Exhibit 7; Trial Exhibit 17; Trial Exhibit 142, 
116.) 
54. Sandy City never suggested that the various Horman family entities would 
not receive the benefits under the agreement. (R. 1464, p. 208, Ins. 22-25; p. 209, Ins. 1-
23.) 
55. Sandy City did not claim there was no privity or successor status until well 
after the litigation began. (R. 1464, p. 208, Ins. 22-25; p. 209, Ins. 1-23; see Trial Exhibit 17; 
Trial Exhibit 142.) 
56. At the time of the filing of this action, Plaintiffs' damages totaled 
approximately $142, 917.66. {See Trial Exhibit 21.) 
57. At the time of trial, Plaintiffs' damages had increased to approximately 
$404,067.57. (R. 1464, p. 87, Ins. 12-22; p. 236, Ins. 7-10; R. 1465, p. 281, Ins. 11-21; see 
Trial Exhibit 1, Trial Exhibit 5; Trial Exhibit 6(A).) 
58. Sandy City obtained water rights (and water-related assets) from the Hormans 
that are extremely valuable and worth far more than the value of the Horman properties. R. 
1464, p. 15, Ins. 21-23; p. 25, Ins. 2-7; p. 104, Ins. 7-25; R. 1465, p. 270, Ins. 12-25; p. 274, 
Ins. 2-5; see Trial Exhibit 23.) 
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59. Sandy City has received tens of millions of dollars in income from those water 
rights since 1975. (R. 1464, p. 25, Ins. 4-7; R. 1465, p. 295, Ins. 1-14; see Trial Exhibit 29.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred in finding the 1975 Contract between Bell Mountain and Sandy 
was not validly assigned to Plaintiffs, thus denying Plaintiffs standing to pursue their claims 
against the City. On three occasions the Court declined to rule this way in response to Sandy 
City's Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. Trial did not produce any additional 
or different information to support the conclusion that the Contract was not assigned. The 
Contract was assigned at the time of the original dissolution4, and then again assigned when 
the paperwork from the first assignment was lost. Both were sufficient to give the Plaintiffs1 
standing. 
If Plaintiffs were not parties to the 1975 Contract, they are clearly intended third-party 
beneficiaries to the agreement and are entitled to enforce it. The 1975 Contract identifies the 
entire area described as Horman properties, a tract of approximately 1,000 acres, as the 
benefitted property. The 1975 Contract identifies successors in interest and the property 
itself, along with the unincorporated Horman properties as benefitting from the Contract. 
4
 Although unavailable during trial, in February 2009, while remodeling a building 
owned by the Horman family, approximately 50 boxes of old documents were found. 
Included in those previously lost files were the original corporate books of Bell Mountain 
Corporation, which also contained the original, signed Plan of Liquidation. The Plan of 
Liquidation states that all the assets of Bell Mountain Corporation are to be assigned to the 
shareholders of the corporation. Plaintiffs sought relief from the trial court's judgment based 
on the newly found evidence supporting an assignment of the 1975 Contract to the 
shareholders. The court denied Plaintiffs' request for relief from the judgment of dismissal. 
(R. 1456-1462, Ruling dated June 30, 2009.) 
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Subsequent changes in structure by the Horman family due to tax planning never altered the 
owners, never changed who was developing the property and never released Sandy from its 
obligations under the Contract. 
Before any dispute arose, the course of dealing between the parties shows both 
Plaintiffs and Sandy City interpreted the 1975 Contract to waive flood control fees and one-
half of the park fees on the Horman properties. When interpreting the terms of any 
agreement, the parties1 own conduct before a dispute is relevant to meaning. Here, the parties 
both interpreted the agreement to waive these fees, despite various family entities being the 
identified developer. The ultimate breach by Sandy was motivated only by the need for 
money, and not a legitimate difference in view of the Contract's meaning. 
The Trial Court erred in failing to interpret the 1975 Contract in accordance with 
established principals of contract interpretation, including contra proferentum. Contract 
terms are construed against the author of the language. Here Sandy City drafted the 1975 
Contract. The City relied on the minutes of the Sandy City Council, which reflect the 
direction to legal counsel as to the meaning and intent of the 1975 Contract. In both the 
Minutes and the Contract, it is clear Sandy City intended the benefits of the fee waivers to 
apply to all 1,000 acres of developable land belonging to the Horman family. 
The Trial Court erred in imposing a time limit upon the "Winding Up" of a 
corporation where no time limit is specified in the Utah corporate statute governing winding 
up. The Trial Court invented a deadline which the Legislature of Utah did not adopt, then 
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chose to impose it here as the new judicially created rule governing corporate wind up. This 
was wrong. 
The Trial Court erred by failing to find that Plaintiffs have standing to enforce the 
1975 Contract because the Contract runs with the land. Everything about the Contract terms 
make it clear the parties intended in 1975 for the benefits to last so long as the Horman 
properties remained under development. The 1975 Contract clearly applied to a 1,000 acres 
tract of land belonging to the Horman family. It is the same family developing the same land 
which is now asking for the Contract to be enforced. Further, all the original signatories to 
the Agreement testified exactly the same way: it was the intent of the signatories that the 
1975 Contract run with the land. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Finding the 1975 Contract Between Bell 
Mountain and Sandy Was Not Validly Assigned to Plaintiffs, Thus 
Denying Plaintiffs Standing to Pursue Their Claims Against the City. 
The 1975 Contract was between Sandy City and two groups or entities. One of the 
groups was Bell Mountain Corporation. The other was Horman properties. Bell Mountain 
was a corporation owned by members of the Horman family, now dissolved. Horman 
properties was the land owned by the Horman family and its various members. While Bell 
Mountain may have needed to assign its interests, Horman properties IS the very group now 
suing to enforce their agreement. To the extent that the Contract was with Homian 
properties, these are the very Plaintiffs who sued. To the extent the Contract was with Bell 
Mountain Corporation, the Contract expressly states it is binding on the parties as well as 
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their "successors and assigns." (Trial Exhibit, 6C, ^  20.) The trial court was incorrect, as a 
matter of law, when it found: 
Plaintiffs were not party to the 1975 Contract they sue to enforce, therefore, 
to have standing to sue Plaintiffs must be assignees of Bell Mountain or 
intended third-party beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract. 
Plaintiffs claim they have standing as successors in interest to Bell Mountain. 
A dissolved entity may only conduct activities 'appropriate to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs.1 Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l). For an 
enforceable assignment there must be an act or manifestation by the assignor 
indicating the intent to transfer the right to the assignee as the time the 
corporation was in existence... . 
(R. 1122, |^f 18-19.) The trial court's analysis focused exclusively on an assignment of the 
1975 Contract, it never meaningfully considered whether Plaintiffs qualify as successors to 
Bell Mountain and Horman properties. The trial court improperly merged the analysis of 
Plaintiffs' rights as successors with their status as assignees. In interpreting a contract 
provision, such as paragraph 20 of the 1975 Contract, a court determines the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law. Red Cliffs 
Corner v. J.J. Hunan, Inc., 2009 UT App 240, {^22; Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. 
Rous. Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d at 295. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[o]ne can be a 'successor in interest' by 
assignment or conveyance as well as by descent." Clotworthy v. Clyde, 265 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1954). The legal definition of a successor in interest is "[o]ne who follows another in 
ownership or control of the property." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. rev.) quoted in Trial 
Brief at 22. That same dictionary makes clear that "[a] successor in interest retains the same 
rights as the original owner, with no change in substance." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 
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2004); see also Waterbury Equity Hotel, LLC v. City of Waterbury, 858 A.2d 259, 268 
(Conn. App. 2004) ('The plaintiff, in the present case, is a successor in interest and therefore 
in privity with the previous owners because it gained title to the subject property by deed."); 
Home Builders Ass 'n of Central Ariz. v. City ofMaricopa, 158 P.3d 869,874 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2007 ('The word successor has been defined as one who takes the place that another has left, 
and sustains the like part or character.M)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
Odessa Textis Sheriffs Posse, Inc. v. Ector County, 215 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tex. App. 2006) 
(recognizing that, when corporations are involved, "a successor is ordinarily one that acquires 
the rights and liabilities of another by amalgamation, consolidation, or duly authorized 
succession.") 
Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Bell Mountain and/or ARE Horman properties 
because Plaintiffs (1) own and control the Horman properties listed in the 1975 Contract and 
(2) received that ownership through conveyance by deed or express assignment (which has 
since been lost). Bell Mountain transferred real property by warranty deed to Plaintiffs. 
(Trial Exhibit 37 (A)-(H).) "Horman properties" was, is and always has been owned by 
members of the Horman family, who are the Plaintiffs in this matter. Plaintiffs retain and 
have always possessed ownership of the "Horman properties." As Dave Evans testified at 
trial, the Horman properties are held in various entities owned by Charles Horman and 
Gordon Johnson, who are the original shareholders of Bell Mountain and, with their children, 
are the current owners of Plaintiffs. (R. 1646, p. 167, Ins. 7-23; see Trial Exhibit 37.) 
Additionally, Bell Mountain was dissolved, transferring all of its assets and liabilities to 
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Plaintiffs as part of a complex tax-planning strategy. (R. 1464, p. 206, Ins. 13-25; p. 207, Ins. 
1 -25; p. 211, Ins. 1 -14.) Therefore, Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Bell Mountain and 
the court erred in finding otherwise. 
Sandy City gave no evidence contrary to Plaintiffs' proof of its standing as a successor 
in interest to Bell Mountain. They only offered an argument. That argument asserted 
without proof that Bell Mountain did not have the authority to transfer the 1975 Contract to 
Plaintiffs because it was an expired corporation. Sandy's flawed argument improperly 
merges the legal distinction between "successors" and "assigns" as used in the 1975 Contract. 
It is an abuse of discretion and contrary to existing law for the trial court to merge 
these arguments. The 1975 Contract distinguished between "successors" and "assigns." The 
legal standard in Utah for a "successor in interest" is separate and distinct from an 
assignment. Specifically, Utah law states "a successor is by assignment or conveyance as 
well as by descent." Clotworthy, 265 P.2d at 421. Here, because Plaintiffs received title to 
the property by descent and by a conveyance from Bell Mountain, Plaintiffs are successors 
in interest. Alternatively, Horman properties ARE the Plaintiffs and are the same family as 
originally contracted to give away tens of millions of dollars in value in the water rights, 
build the water tank, and thereby qualify for waiver of the fees. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in concluding Plaintiffs cannot enforce the 1975 Contract against Sandy City. 
-23-
2. . If Plaintiffs Are Not Parties, Successors or Assigns to the 1975 Contract, 
They Are Intended Third-Party Beneficiaries to the Contract and Are 
Entitled to Enforce it. 
As an alternative to direct standing, Plaintiffs also qualified as third-party 
beneficiaries entitled to enforce the 1975 Contract against Sandy City. Whether Plaintiffs 
qualify as intended third-party beneficiaries must be determined from the intentions of the 
parties as set forth in the contract language. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust vs. Dickamore, 652 
P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982). The trial court improperly concluded Plaintiffs were not 
intended third-party beneficiaries. (Findings of Fact, R. 1117-1130, \ 20.) The trial court 
rejected Plaintiffs' standing as third-party beneficiaries on one basis alone - that, even 
assuming Plaintiffs are part of "Horman properties" as used in Paragraph 12 of the 1975 
Contract, "the intended benefit conferred upon them was not for a waiver of flood control 
fees" because it was only to "defer payment of all water connection fees and charges which 
would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman properties." {Id) The 
trial court's conclusion is both overreaching and error. 
"For a third party to have enforceable rights under a contract, then, that party must be 
an 'intended beneficiary' of the contract, and the intention of the parties is to be determined 
from the terms of the contract as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances." Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). "The intent of the 
contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear." Id. {citing Rio 
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 4797, 506 (Utah 1980)); see also Mel Trimble Real 
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Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981) (one only incidentally benefitted may 
not maintain an action against the promisor). 
Here, Plaintiffs are intended third-party beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract because 
they are "owners of the said lots located in the Pepperwood Subdivision." {See Plaintiffs 
Trial Exhibit 6(C), f 12.) Paragraph 12 of the 1975 Contract states "neither Bell Mountain 
Corporation nor the owners of the said lots located in the Pepperwood Subdivision shall 
be required to pay 'flood control fees' as part of a connection fee and shall pay only one-half 
of the otherwise required 'park fee.'" {See Trial Exhibit 6C, <| 12)(emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs' position is supported by section 302 of the Restatement of Contracts, which 
provides that: 
[ujnless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a 
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in 
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . 
. the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to 
pay money to the beneficiary. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302(1 )(a) (1981); Brigham Young v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 684 (Utah 2005). 
A benefit is clearly intended for owners of the Horman property lots located in 
Pepperwood, which are undeniably the Plaintiffs. Specifically, Bell Mountain transferred 
its interests in the "Horman properties" to Plaintiffs with various transfers by deed to Plaintiff 
Johnson, Plaintiff Horman, Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment, and Plaintiff Scandia Investment. 
{See Trial Exhibit, 37 (A)-(H).) Each transfer is accompanied by a warranty deed evidencing 
a transfer of a portion of "Horman properties" to Plaintiffs. Therefore, Plaintiffs are 
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consideredf 'owners of said lots/' as they are in the chain of title to the property. Because the 
contract clearly intended to benefit the lot owners with a waiver of flood control fees and 
one-half of the park fees, and Plaintiffs are lot owners, Plaintiffs are entitled to enforce the 
obligations of the 1975 Contract against Sandy city as intended third-party beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in its conclusion and should be reversed. 
The plain language of the 1975 Contract specifically identifies three parties: Sandy 
City, Bell Mountain, and lot owners. Sandy and Bell Mountain were the parties to the 1975 
Contract and, therefore, could not be third-party beneficiaries. However, the lot owners are 
intended beneficiaries to the 1975 Contract. The Contract conveys a benefit to lot owners: 
a waiver of the flood control fees and one-half of the park fees. (R. 1464, p. 56, Ins. 1-23.) 
Sandy, Horman properties and Bell Mountain intended the lot owners to benefit from these 
waivers, and the lot owners are Plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the trial court erred and 
should be reversed. 
3. The Course of Dealing Between the Horman Family and Sandy City 
Shows That Sandy City Interpreted the 1975 Contract to Waive Flood 
Control Fees and One-Half of the Park Fees on All of the Horman 
Properties. 
The trial court erred in not considering the course of conduct between Plaintiffs and 
Sandy in interpreting the 1975 Contract. The trial court found "[bjased upon the Court's 
decision that the Plaintiffs lack standing, the Court need not address the other claims and 
arguments raised by the parties," yet it also found "no [flood control maintenance] fees were 
charged to Bell Mountain and later developers of the property, namely the Plaintiffs ...." (R. 
1126-1127, ^ 5(B)(2).) The trial court acknowledged the course of conduct between the 
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parties, waiving the flood control fees and one-half of the park fees to Plaintiffs as 
developers of the property, yet ruled Plaintiffs' did not have standing. The trial court erred, 
by not finding Plaintiffs have standing when Sandy interpreted the 1975 Contract to waive 
flood control fees for property Plaintiffs were developing until it became a burden on Sandy 
City, and the City decided to breach the 1975 Contract. 
MIn the interpretation of contract, the interpretation given by the parties themselves as 
shown by their acts will be adopted by the court." Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 266 P.2d 
494, 496 (Utah 1954) {citing 3 Williston on Contracts, § 623); see also Ogden Electric Co. 
v. Engineers, 151 F.2d 657, 659 (10th Cir. 1945) ("It is also the settled law of Utah that the 
construction which the parties themselves place upon a contract will be given consideration 
when it becomes necessary to interpret the terms of the contract."); Flexfab, LLC v. United 
States, 424 F.3d 1254, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[I]ntent is determined by looking to the 
contract and, if necessary, other objective evidence. In the absence of clear guidance from 
the contract language, the requisite intent on the part of the government can be inferred from 
the actions of the contracting officer. . . .") 
Here, the trial court acknowledged the parties interpreted the 1975 Contract to waive 
flood control fees, yet failed to hold Sandy City to its own interpretation of the 1975 
Contract. In failing to hold Sandy City to abide by its contractual obligations, the trial court 
erred. Specifically, Charles Horman testified "[t]he city honored [the 1975 Contract] for over 
two decades and the fees changed during that time and they waived them every time." (R. 
1464, p. 57, Ins. 14-23.) He fiirther testified "[e]very [phase of development Sandy] waived 
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fee on, maybe 19 phases of Pepperwood ... [Sandy] waived the fees on each and every one 
of them and we did them in different entities, under different administrations and the contract 
was always honored." (R. 1464, p. 80:1-11.) In Sandy's water approval letter, dated July 7, 
1998, it states M[t]his letter confirms that Pepperwood Phase 10A subdivision development 
located at approximately 11200 South Wasatch Boulevard being developed by Legacy 
Development Company will be served culinary water as part of Sandy City's total water 
system." (See Trial Exhibit 142, p. 1.) In paragraph 16 of the letter, it states "[pjursuant to 
a prior agreement dated June 25,1975 between the City and Bell Mountain Corporation, the 
developer's predecessor in interest, the developer is entitled to water letters for 468 
connections in the area defined in Exhibit A." (Id. at [^16.) Additionally, attached to the 
letter was a copy of the 1975 Contract. Id. Sandy City sent this letter, acloiowledging Legacy 
Development as a successor to Bell Mountain, nearly 23 years after the 1975 Contract was 
signed. 
The trial court erred in not taking into account the parties' course of conduct. Plaintiff 
Charles Horman testified the parties interpreted the 1975 Contract to waive all flood control 
fees for any developing entity and Sandy had upheld this interpretation for over 20 years. 
Further, the July 7, 1998 letter drafted by Sandy shows Sandy's interpretation of the 1975 
Contract was to waive flood control fees for Bell Mountain and its successors, Plaintiffs. See 
Trial Exhibit 142. 
As shown by their conduct and interaction, both Plaintiffs and Sandy interpreted the 
1975 Contract as waiving flood control fees and one-half of the park fees for all of the 
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"Horman properties." Specifically, for nearly 30 years, Sandy interpreted the 1975 Contract 
to include Bell Mountain successors, Legacy Development and Plaintiffs, and enforced the 
terms of paragraph 12 to waive those fees for all of "Horman properties." Therefore, the trial 
court erred in failing to consider the parties' contemporaneous interpretation and conduct 
relating to the 1975 Contract. 
4. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Interpret the Contract in Accordance 
with Established Principals of Contract Interpretation, Including Contra 
Proferentem. 
The trial court erred in failing to interpret the 1975 Contract against its drafter, Sandy. 
The trial court found Paragraph 12 of the 1975 Contract to be ambiguous. (R. 1126-1128, 
Tf5 (A)-(B).) Notwithstanding that fact, the trial court failed to consider well established 
doctrines and rules of contract interpretation in determining the meaning of Paragraph 12. 
The doctrine of contra proferentem requires the court to construe any ambiguities 
against the drafter. Tahitian Noni Intern. v.Dean,2009WL 197525, (D.Utah 2009); see also 
Express Recoveiy Services, Inc. v. Rice, 125 P.3d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("We note that 
if there are any ambiguities in this contract, however, they should be construed against 
Express Recovery Services, as successor to the drafter."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 206 (1981). Several Utah cases have invoked the doctrine but have typically not elaborated 
on its proper role. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) ("The 
well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract 
should be resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement."); Parks Enters., Inc. v. 
New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also settled law that a 
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contract will be construed against the drafter."); In re Estate of Orris, 622 P.2d 337, 339 
(Utah 1980) (language of an ambiguous instrument should be construed most strictly against 
the party who drafted the instrument). 
Utah recognizes where a document is ambiguous, it is appropriate to construe it 
"strictly against the party who wrote it," but also appropriate to "take extraneous evidence 
and look to the total circumstances to determine what the parties should reasonably be 
deemed to have understood thereby." Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest Realty & Fin., Inc., 544 
P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975). While the opinion does not say so, it is obvious there is nothing 
left to construe - "strictly against the party who wrote it" or otherwise - if extraneous 
evidence clearly establishes "what the parties should reasonably be deemed to have 
understood" in executing an agreement. Id. "In choosing among reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates 
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook&McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1372 (Utah 1996) {citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 206 (1981)). 
The trial court failed to construe the 1975 Contract against Sandy, as required under 
Utah law. Though finding the language in Paragraph 12 to be ambiguous, the trial court did 
not construe the language against Sandy. Plaintiffs' interpretation of Paragraph 12 is 
reasonable and in line with the evidence at trial. Sandy agrees to "[d]efer all water 
connection and associated water charges of the Bell Mountain Corp. and Horman properties 
located east of 2000 East, north of 12000 South and south of 10000 South ... [and] [ejxempt 
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Pepperwood from the flood maintenance fee." (See Trial Exhibit 10.) As testified at trial, 
Sandy drafted the language in the 1975 Contract, including "how [Sandy] referred to [the 
Horman] property" and that "Pepperwood and that description were used interchangeably." 
(R. 1464, p. 40, Ins. 7-20.) Further, the affidavit of Charles Horman, Gordon Johnson, and 
Dewey Bluth support the interpretation that Sandy agreed to waive all flood control fees and 
one-half of the park fees for the "Horman properties." (See Trial Exhibit 20, *f 3(d).) 
The trial court failed to consider this evidence and failed to construe the 1975 Contract 
against Sandy. Therefore, the trial court erred and should be reversed. 
5. The Trial Court Erred in Finding a Time Limit for "Winding Up" of a 
Corporation, Where No Such Time Limit Is Imposed by Statute. 
The trial court found there was no valid assignment of the 1975 Contract by Bell 
Mountain because Bell Mountain had been administratively dissolved in 1993. (R. 1120-
1122, f 19.) The trial court accepted the City's argument that a dissolved corporation has 
only two years to complete all activities related to its winding up. This was error. 
The Utah corporate code provides that "a corporation administratively dissolved under 
this section [16-10a-1422] continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business except: (i) the business necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs 
under Section 16-10a-1405[.]" Under Utah Code Anno. §16-10a-1405, a dissolved 
corporation "continues its corporate existence" and "may . . .carry on any business . . . 
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs[.]" Utah Code § 16-10a-
1405(1). Those activities include "disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in 
kind to its shareholders;" "distributing its remaining property among its shareholders 
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according to their interests;55 and "doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate 
its business and affairs." Id. at § 16-10a-1405(l)(b), (d), (e). 
Nothing in the Utah corporations code specifies a date or deadline for undertaking 
winding-up of a corporation. "Although other states may statutorily limit the time allowed 
for winding up to a specific number of years, the Utah statute has no such limitation. And 
[the Utah Court of Appeals is] not aware of, nor does [appellant] point to, any case law that 
would suggest that the time frame for winding up is otherwise restricted to a specific time 
period.n Terry v. Wilkinson Farm, 173 P.3d 204, 207-08 (Ut. Ct. App. 2007). 
Notwithstanding the lack of any deadline contained in the statute, the trial 
court limited the time period for winding up activities to two years. This is reversible error. 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 296 (Utah Ct. App. July 13, 2006), is controlling on this 
question. In Orvis, the Utah Court of Appeals allowed a dissolved limited liability company 
(LLC) to transfer an interest in a judgment, rejecting arguments that the assignment was void 
due to the LLC's dissolved status. Id. at 296. This Court held that under Utah law, "a 
contract entered into by a dissolved corporation is, at most, merely voidable by the party who 
entered into the contract with the dissolved corporation," but not void. Id. Although the 
decision does not indicate how long after the dissolution the transfer occurred, this Court 
expressed no concern about the timing of the transfer by the dissolved entity. Id. 
The Orvis court cited Utah statutes governing LLCs that are very similar to the Utah 
statutes governing corporations, which (a) provide that both types of entities continue to exist 
after being dissolved (including administratively dissolved), (b) make clear that both types 
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of entities may carry on business necessary to wind up and liquidate their businesses and 
affairs after dissolution, (c) set no deadline for the conclusion of winding-up activities, yet 
(d) do provide that the dissolved entities' names will be available for use by others after two 
years. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1405(l)(b),(d),(e); 16-10a-l42l(l)(f) (statutes 
governing corporations), andUtah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-1203; 48-2c-1302(l), cited in Orvis, 
2006 WL 1917915 at *2; Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1207. See also Miller v. Celebration 
Mining Co., 29 P.3d 1231,1235-36 (Utah2001) (recognizing that contract executed by entity 
that had been administratively dissolved three years prior to contract was voidable at the 
option of the defendants and affirming decision by trial court that contract was void based 
on the defendants' election). 
This rule of law is followed in other jurisdictions. In deciding whether a time limit 
could be set on a winding up period in Oregon, the Federal Court of Claims, applying Oregon 
law, stated that, "Oregon corporate law sets no time limit on the wind up period of a 
dissolved corporation and anticipates that the process may extend indefinitely^]" Curtis v. 
United States, 63 Fed. CI. 172, 174 (Fed. Ct. CI. 2004). The Curtis court further held that 
a post-dissolution transfer of assets was valid three years after the entity administratively 
dissolved. Id. at 174, 176-77. The Curtis court relied heavily on an Oregon decision that 
recognized as valid a transfer that occurred over forty years into the wind up period. Id. at 
177 (citing City of Klamath Falls v. Bell, 7 Or. App. 330,490 P.2d 515,520-21 (1971). See 
also Falcone v. Hinsdale Gym & Obstetrics, Ltd., 499 N.E.2d 694, 699 (111. App. Ct. 1986) 
("Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, a lease to which a corporation is a party survives 
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dissolution of the corporation and it may be assigned in the course of liquidation and winding 
up.") (internal citations omitted); Smith v. Taylor-Morely, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Mo. 
App. 1996). 
The trial court stated the 2005 Assignment was "not made during Bell Mountain's 
existence and therefore was untimely [and] ... If Bell Mountain was still winding up its 
affairs after its administrative dissolution, then for Bell Mountain to continue to act as a legal 
entity it should have applied for reinstatement within two years." (R. 1121, ^ 19.) The trial 
court's conclusion is directly contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Orvis, supra, 
and the Utah Corporate Code. There is no time limitation imposed upon a corporation to 
wind up its affairs. 
Further, there was testimony during trial that Bell Mountain made an assignment in 
1987 as part of an estate- and tax-planning structure for the Horman family. (See R. 1464, 
p. 165, Ins. 3-21.) The trial court stated it "did not find credible the testimony that their [sic] 
was a past assignment from Bell Mountain that could not be located." (R. 1122, fn. 5.) 
However, the only evidence at trial proved an assignment was made. Dave Evans, the 
Certified Public Accountant for Bell Mountain in 1987, testified a valid assignment was 
made as part of the tax-planning strategy for the Horman family. (R. 1464, p. 165, Ins. 3-21.) 
Evans further testified a formal liquidation agreement was prepared "generically assigning 
all contracts, agreements, so forth to the successor entity." (Id. atp. 165, Ins. 7-8.) However, 
the document was believed to have been destroyed after a complex IRS audit on Bell 
Mountain and the Horman family. (Id. atp. 165,1ns. 1-18.) The trial court refused Plaintiffs' 
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motion for relief from the ruling when newly discovered evidence of the liquidation plan was 
discovered after trial. (See R. 1456-1462, Ruling dated June 30, 2009.) 
The only evidence on record is that the 1975 Contract was assigned to Plaintiffs as 
part of the winding up of Bell Mountain. Sandy provided no evidence to the contrary. 
Therefore, the trial court ruled in error and should be reversed. 
6. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Find That Plaintiffs Have Standing 
to Enforce the Agreement Because the Agreement Runs with the Land. 
In Utah, courts have held there is a four-part inquiry to determine if a covenant runs 
with the land. "(1) The covenant must 'touch and concern5 the land; (2) the covenanting 
parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there must be privity of estate." 
Flying Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 627 (Utah 1989) (citing e.g., 165 
Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 314 
U.S. 682, 62 S.Ct. 186, 86 L.Ed. 546 (1941); Eagle Enterprises, Inc. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 
505, 507, 349 N.E.2d 816, 819, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (1976); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions § 30, at 600-01 (1965 & Supp. 1989); 5 R. Powell, The Law of 
Real Property % 673[1], at 60-37 (1988)). In addition, some courts require a fourth element, 
that the covenant to be in writing.5 Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 623 (citation omitted). 
The trial court found M[t]he first and fourth elements are clearly met," meaning the 
covenant in the 1975 Contract did touch and concern the land and the agreement is in 
5This requirement is satisfied by the written 1975 Contract between the original 
parties. The fact that the 1975 Contract was not recorded does not defeat or prevent the 
argument that the covenants contained in the Agreement run with the land. Instead, the 
notice is necessary only against a bona fide purchaser of the burdened estate. See David 
A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property § 12.04(b)(3). Notice (2005). 
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writing.6 (R. 1119, f 21.) However, the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find 
Plaintiffs ha[ve standing to enforce the 1975 Contract because privity of estate exists and the 
intent of the parties clearly shows an intent for the covenant to run with the land. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Not Finding Intent For the Agreement 
to Run with the Land Because the Original Signatories to the 
Agreement Testified to the Intent and the Parties Actions During 
the Past 30 Years Show Intent. 
Under Utah law, the parties must intend the agreement to run with the land. See 
Flying Diamond Oil, supra. The trial court found: 
Plaintiffs failed to meet its [sic] burden to show that the intent of the parties 
that the 1975 Contract or the waiver of flood control fees provision would 
run with the land. The boilerplate language in paragraph 20 of the 1975 
Contract that it is 'binding on both parties, their successors and assigns' 
merely acknowledges that the document is assignable, not that the flood 
control fee waiver was a covenant that would run with the land beyond that 
property being developed at the time. 
(R. 1119421.) 
The trial court erred finding no intent of the parties. "An express statement in the 
document creating the covenant that the parties intend to create a covenant running with 
the land is usually dispositive of the intent issue. The parties' intent may also be implied 
by the nature of the covenant itself." Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 628 (citing Pedro 
v. Humboldt County, 211 Cal. 493, 497, 19 P.2d 776, 777 (Cal. 1933); Brendonwood 
Common v. Franklin, 403 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980); Levy v. Graham, 347 
6Though the trial court did not go into any detail on how the elements are met, 
Plaintiffs do not contest this finding. 
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So.2d 1180, 1181 (La.Ct.App. l911);Reichertv. Weeden, 190 Mont. 95, 618P.2d 1216, 
1219 (Mont. 1980)). 
Here, the parties intended the covenant to run with the land, as shown expressly by 
the affidavit and testimony of the original negotiators and impliedly in the contract itself. 
The original negotiators of the 1975 Contract each signed an affidavit acknowledging the 
intent of the parties. (See Trial Exhibit 20, Affidavit of Charles H. Horman, M. Gordon 
Johnson & Dewey Bluth, f 3(d)-(e) ("The Agreement provides that all of the Pepperwood 
Subdivision be forever exempt from paying Sandy flood control fees and one half of Sandy 
required park fees. We agreed to that and both sides understood that was what we were 
accomplishing with the Agreement").7 It is undisputed Dewey Bluth, the negotiator of the 
1975 Contract for Sandy and its mayor at the time, intended the Pepperwood subdivision 
to be forever exempt from the fees. He was deceased at the time of trial, but his affidavit 
had been provided years earlier while the parties were trying to resolve this matter. The 
affidavit was part of the evidence at trial, but the trial court failed to even acknowledge his 
affidavit in its ruling, instead stating Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show intent of 
the parties with the "boilerplate" language. 
7The Agreement runs with the land. The underlying purpose of the Agreement 
supports the contention that the Agreement was intended to create a covenant that would 
run with the land. See 9 Powell, supra § 60.04[3][b] at 60-50 to -51 (stating the focus in 
determining whether a covenant was intended to run with the land is on the subjective state 
of mind of the original parties, and that the intent is generally gleaned from "the language 
of their transaction, read in light of the circumstances of its formulation"). It should also 
be noted that Sandy City failed to interview, depose, or question Mr. Horman, Mr. 
Johnson, or Mr. Bluth regarding the affidavit. (See Testimony of Shane Pace, Tr., pp. 
399-400.) 
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Further, the other two original negotiators, Charles Horman and Gordon Johnson, 
testified to the intent of the parties at the time of negotiating the 1975 Contract.8 As to the 
parties exempted from flood control fees and one half of the park fees, Gordon Johnson 
testified "All of the Horman properties... everything within those coordinates, within that 
orange area of the Horman properties would be exempted." (R. 1465, p. 267, Ins. 18 -
p. 268, Ins. 5.) Charles Horman also testified "[the 1975] contract applied to everything 
that had yet to be developed and didn't apply to everything that had already been done .... 
This was to solve the problem for all of the undeveloped land." (R. 1464, p. 42, Ins. 19-
24.) Again, the trial court failed to acknowledge the testimony of the original negotiators 
and signatories to the 1975 Contract. The trial court erred in failing to consider this 
evidence of intent. Sandy offered nothing in opposition. 
While the affidavit and testimony make the intent of the parties to the Agreement 
clear, the language and nature of the Agreement implies the intent as well. ( See Trial 
Exhibit 6C, % 12.) For example, paragraph 12 of the Agreement provides protections to 
Bell Mountain Corporation, "Horman properties" and owners of the lots in question. Qd.) 
The protections given to non-parties to the Agreement shows the parties intended the 
covenant to run with the land and not be restricted as merely personal promises between 
the two signatories to the contract. Whether the parties intended that the covenants run 
with the land is answered by Sandy's practice, for decades, of charging the lot buyers one 
8
 Dewey Bluth was unavailable to testify because he passed away prior to the trial 
date. 
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half of the park fees when the owner builds his home. ( See Trial Exhibit 21.) This 
contemporaneous and long-standing practice shows Sandy's interpretation of the agreement 
has always been the same as Plaintiffs'. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Not Finding Privity of Estate Because 
Plaintiffs are Successors in Interest to Bell Mountain and Both 
Sandy City and Plaintiffs Had a Simultaneous Interest in the 
Horman Property. 
Privity of estate is one requirement for an agreement to run with the land. The trial 
court erred in not finding privity of estate. The trial court found: 
[Pjrivity of estate is lacking because (1) the City was never in the chain of 
title to the property at issue, and (2) the 1975 Contract is outside the chain 
of title because (a) it was not recorded with the County recorder's officer, 
(b) the deed whereby Bell Mountain transferred the propety did not refer to 
the 1975 Contract, and (c) the deeds in which Long view Development 
transferred the property to Plaintiffs also failed to refer to the 1975 Contract. 
(R. 1119, % 21.) (emphasis in original).) 
The trial court erred in not finding privity of estate because there was evidence and 
testimony showing Plaintiffs were successors to the 1975 Contract and showing Sandy was 
in the chain of title to the property. 
"The types of privity are (1) mutual, i.e., a covenant arising from simultaneous 
interests in the same land; (2) horizontal, i.e., a covenant created in connection with a 
conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to another; and (3) vertical, i.e., the 
devolution of an estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting 
party to a successor." See Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 628 (citing Berger, A Policy 
Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land , 55 Minn.L.Rev. 167, 179-207 (1970) 
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[hereafter Berger]). "Mutual privity exists when the parties have a continuing and 
simultaneous interest in the same property." Id. (Citing Berger, at 180). "Horizontal privity 
exists when the original covenanting parties create a covenant in connection with a 
simultaneous conveyance of an estate." Id. (citing 5 R. Powell, % 673 [2] [c], at 60-61; Berger, 
at 181). In this case, there is vertical privity and mutual privity. 
Vertical privity mandates a connection between one of the original parties and the 
successor to the benefit or burden of the covenant. See David A. Thomas and James H. 
Backman, Utah Real Property Law, § 12.04(b)(2)(2005). In Flying Diamond, the Utah 
Supreme Court found vertical privity was present because "the person presently claiming the 
benefit... is a successor to the estate of the original person so benefitted" and that person is 
not an adverse possessor. Flying Diamond, 116 P.2d at 628, fn. 12 (citation omitted).9 Here, 
Plaintiffs are successors and assigns to the original party (Bell Mountain). As Charles 
Horman and Dave Evans testified at trial, there was an assignment of all interests in Bell 
Mountain to Plaintiffs, as an estate- and tax-planning strategy. (R. 1464, p. 167, Ins. 7-23; 
p. 206, 13-24.) These documents were believed to have been mistakenly destroyed in the 
process of cleaning out old files. (Id. at p. 165, Ins. 1-18.) Further, an assignment occurred 
in 2005, transferring any interests in any property or contracts from Bell Mountain to 
Plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 166, Ins. 19-25; p. 167, Ins. 1-6.) Therefore, vertical privity exists 
9The Utah Supreme Court also noted that courts have abandoned a strict approach 
to privity doctrine and held that substance should prevail over technical application. Flying 
Diamond, 776 P.2d at 628 fn. 13. 
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between Horman properties/Bell Mountain, the original parties and the successors, and 
Plaintiffs. 
Further, contrary to the trial court's findings, Sandy City was in the chain of title 
to the property. As Charles Horman testified, the Horman well, the water rights and the 
well itself, the property for the well itself were deeded to Sandy City. (R. 1464, p. 53, 
Ins. 9-19.) The real property, along with necessary easements, were transferred to Sandy 
City. (Id.) Plaintiffs also transferred the land underneath the pumping station for the 
reservoir. (Id. at p. 93, Ins. 19-24.) The trial court erred in finding Sandy never had an 
interest in the property. Sandy was in the chain of title to the property and did receive the 
benefit from the 1975 contract: the well, water rights, and property. There was no 
evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the trial court erred and privity exists. 
Mutual privity also existed between Bell Mountain and Sandy. Mutual privity is 
present when a covenant arises from simultaneous interests in the same property. Flying 
Diamond, 776 P.2d at 628. At the time of the Agreement, Bell Mountain Corporation 
owned the property. Sandy had an interest in the same property as the taxing authority 
imposing water connection fees and charges, flood control fees and park fees on the 
property. (R). 1464, p. 236, Ins. 7-10; see Trial Exhibit 5.) The very covenant at issue 
in this proceeding concerns the deferral and abatement of those fees to Bell Mountain 
Corporation, Horman properties and the lot owners by Sandy. Sandy would certainly 
claim authority over such parties. 
-41-
Therefore, Plaintiffs are successors in interests and assignees to the agreement with 
Sandy. Further, the agreement runs with the land, conferring a benefit on Plaintiffs, as 
successors and assigns. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and the law, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully 
request this Court reverse the error of the Third District Court, and remand this matter back 
for a decision on the merits. 
DATED this *Z\^ day of October, 2009. 
< c =
^ S ^ S O N , SNUFFE%^fflMB\& POULSEN 
H&enver C. Snuffer, Jr 
Steven R. Paul 
Daniel B. Garriott 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 050408561 
Judge Royal I. Hansen 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation and 
JOHN DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for trial on October 21sl through the 23rd of 2008, with the 
Honorable Royal I. Hansen presiding without a jury. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Dan B. Garriott appeared 
on behalf of Hillcrest Investment; Scandia Investment, LLC; Legacy Communities, LLC; Charles H. 
Horman; M. Gordon Johnson; Autumn Ridge Development, LLC; Alta Ridge Development, LLC 
(collectivelyreferred to as "Plaintiffs"). George A. Hunt and Stephen T. Hester appeared onbehalf of Sandy 
1 
City ("City**). At the end of the trial, the Court requested the parties submit post trial briefs and proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and set the matter for argument on December 10,2008. 
With regard to the Dewey Bluth affidavit, the Court admitted the affidavit and gave it the weight and 
credibility the Court deemed necessary in making its findings of facts and conclusions of law. Having 
considered the evidence and testimony received at trial, the parties3 arguments and the law, the Court enters 
the following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L On June 25,1975, the City entered into a contract with non-party Bell Mountain Corporation (Bell 
Mountain) as the developer of a large tract of land on the east side of the city referred to as the 
"Pepperwood Subdivision," which was a "'private* subdivision having development of its own 
streets, parks, etc." (1975 Contract). At the time of entering into the 1975 Contract, Bell Mountain 
Corporation was a Utah for-profit corporation originally fonned on August 6,1971. 
2. In the preamble of the 1975 Contract, the parties acknowledged that the City tchas a need to increase 
water storage and production in its corporate limits particularly on its east side" and that "Bell 
Mountain is developing a large tract of land on the City's east side." Bell Mountain "desires to assist 
Sandy in achieving its goals regarding water development and distribution while likewise developing 
its own properties."1 
1
 Prior to entering into the 1975 Contract, the City had passed a moratorium that 
prohibited any new home construction or lot development due to a lack of water resources that 
would provide adequate fire protection flow rates and water pressure required to comply with the 
Board of Health. The 1975 Contract was an attempt to address this problem and cause the City 
to remove the moratorium so that Bell Mountain could continue its development of the 
Pepperwood Subdivision. 
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3. At the time the City and Bell Mountain entered into the 1975 Contract, only a portion of the 
Pepperwood Subdivision was annexed into the City, about two phases containing 141 RP Zoned lots, 
some of which had been sold to lot owners. 
4. Paragraph 12 of the 1975 Contract states: 
In consideration of the above mentioned efforts and expenditures of Bell 
Mountain Corporation, Sandy shall defer payment of all water connection 
fees and charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain 
Corporation and Horman properties located east of 2000 east, north of 12000 
south and south of 10000 south until such time as building permits are 
applied for by the individual owners of the lots contained therein and shall 
require payment from the said individual owners rather than Bell Mountain 
Corporation such fees as may be required shall be charged as provided by the 
then covenant fee resolution except that with relation to lots located in the 
trRP Zone", neither Bell Mountain Corporation nor the owners of the said lots 
located in the Pepperwood Subdivision shall be required to pay "flood control 
fees" as part of a connection fee and shall pay only one half of the otherwise 
required "park fee." 
5. As reflected by the language in Paragraph 12, the City and Bell Mountain expressly intended to 
provide "Horman properties" and the RP Zone lot owners2 in the Pepperwood Subdivision limited 
benefits under the 1975 Contract: 
A. The City and Bell Mountain intended for ''Horman properties," which was described as 
properties "located east of 2000 east, north of 12000 south and south of 10000 south," to 
receive the limited benefit of a deferment of "payment of all water connection fees and 
charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman 
2
 At the time the parties entered into the 1975 Contract, the only lots located in the "RP 
Zone" consisted of Phases I, II and III of the Pepperwood Subdivision. The remaining property 
then owned by Bell Mountain Corporation and identified as "Horman properties" in the 1975 
Contract was either zoned "A-1" (Agricultural), or had not yet been annexed into Sandy City. 
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properties until such time as building permits are applied for by the individual owners 
of the lots contained therein." Those fees would then be charged to the individual owners of 
the lots. The Horman properties as described in the 1975 Contract encompassed about 1000 
acres that belonged to the Horman family and the family's various legal entities. 
B. The City and Bell Mountain also intended for the owners of the RP Zone lots located in the 
Pepperwood Subdivision to benefit from the 1975 Contract. Specifically, Bell Mountain and 
the RP Zone lot owners would (1) not be required to pay "flood control fees" as part of a 
connection fee, and (2) only be required to pay one half of the otherwise required park fee. 
1. In 1975, park fees were paid by individual lot owners, not developers, therefore, the 
only beneficiary of this portion of paragraph 12 was the RP Zone lot owners that 
bought lots in the Pepperwood Subdivision. 
2. With regard to flood control fees, prior to 1975, Salt Lake County was responsible 
for flood control in the east side of the City, including the property then owned by 
Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman properties. However, by Interlocal 
Agreement dated December 19,1974 and amended February 3,1975, flood control 
responsibility for surface waters on the east side was assumed by the City. Neither 
Salt Lake County nor the City charged Bell Mountain flood control fees on prior 
Phases I and H of the Pepperwood Subdivision.3 The City began charging developers 
3
 There was also sufficient evidence submitted to find that for Phase IE neither Salt Lake 
County nor the City charged Bell Mountain Corporation flood control fees on Phase IE of the 
4 
flood control maintenance fees around March 20, 1975, however, no fees were 
charged to Bell Mountain and later developers of the property, namely the Plaintiffs, 
for the first nine phases of the development of the area based upon a map prepared 
by Salt Lake County. During the time Salt Lake County had flood control 
responsibility over the initial phases of the Pepperwood Subdivision, Salt Lake 
County had developed a map which identified certain portions of the Horman 
property where it was anticipated that natural precipitation would be absorbed into 
the ground on site due to the sandy soil conditions and the relatively flat topography. 
The first nine phases of the Pepperwood Subdivision are located in that certain 
portion of property identified on the Salt Lake County map where the City anticipated 
that natural precipitation would be absorbed into the ground on site due to the sandy 
soil conditions and the relatively flat topography. Therefore, minimal, flood control 
infrastructure was required to be installed in the first nine phases. 
6. Paragraph 20 of the 1975 Contract states: 'This agreement is binding upon both parties, their 
successors and assigns." 
Pepperwood Subdivision because of (1) the County's analysis of surface water drainage indicated 
that the property would be contained on site, and (2) Mr. Horman's representation that "potential 
flood damage up to a ten (10) year storm becomes the responsibility of the Pepperwood 
Homeowner's Association/' 
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7. All of the Plaintiffs claim an interest in the 1975 Contract between the City and Bell Mountain either 
as assigned successors in interest of Bell Mountain or as third party beneficiaries.4 
A. Plaintiffs Charles H. Horman ("Hoiman") and M, Gordon Johnson ("Johnson") are 
individuals who reside in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and who, variously, own and 
manage the other Plaintiff entities. 
B> Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment Company, LLC ("Hillcrest") is currently a limited liability 
company. Originally, Hillcrest was formed as a limited partnershiponOctober 16,1978,and 
then later it was converted into a Utah limited liability company. Currently, Hillcrest is 
managed by Horman, Evans and Christopher A. Howells. 
C. Plaintiff Scandia Investment, LLC ("Scandia") is a Utah limited liability company created 
on August 10,1993. Scandia's members are Johnson and his wife, Veedrienne H. Johnson. 
Veedrienne is the sister of Horman. Scandia is managed by Johnson, and non-parties David 
Evans (trEvans") and David B. Bromley (''Bromley*')-
D. Plaintiff Legacy Communities, LLC ('Legacy") is aUtah limited liability company that was 
created December 29,2003. Legacy's managers are Horman, Johnson and Evans. 
4
 The Court notes that in the Plaintiffs post trial brief and at closing argument seemed to 
be making an equitable claim that based upon the past actions of the City and reliance of the 
Plaintiffs that they were parties or beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract that the City was estopped 
from claiming otherwise now. However, as argued by the City at closing arguments, Plaintiffs 
did not make an estoppel claim, rather this case was tried as a breach of contract, therefore, the 
Court does not consider promissory estoppel to the extent such arguments were made by the 
Plaintiffs. 
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R Plaintiff Autumn Ridge Development, LLC ("Autumn Ridge") is a Utah limited liability 
company created on January 21,1994. Autumn Ridge's members are Johnson and his wife, 
Veedrienne H. Johnson. Autumn Ridge is managed by Johnson, Evans and Bromley. 
F. Plaintiff Alta Ridge Development, LLC ("Alia Ridge") is a Utah limited liability company 
created on April 12,1994. Alta Ridge's members are Horman and his wife, Katherine K> 
Horman. Alta Ridge is managed by Horman. 
The City assessed the Plaintiffs flood control fees on Phase X of the Pepperwood development 
because (1) the topography and soil density of the land rendered it incapable of retaining or 
absorbing flood water on site, and (2) the City was required to construct major flood control 
infrastructure in those areas to control flood water. 
The Plaintiffs paid flood control fees under protest and later sought refunds for the protested flood 
control fees claiming that pursuant to the 1975 Contract they were either successors in interest to 
Bell Mountain or third party beneficiaries. Specifically, Plaintiffs state in their answers to 
interrogatories that; 
This is based upon the agreement between Bell Mountain Corporation and 
Sandy City, in which both Bell Mountain Corporation and "Horman 
Properties" are listed as the beneficiaries of the agreement. Although Bell 
Mountain Corporation was a signatory to the agreement the property was 
developed using various entities. "Horman Properties" was a way of 
referring to the property the Horman family would develop and retail. All of 
the named plaintiffs in this case are affiliated with Bell Mountain 
Corporation, and are included within the description 'Honnan Properties" 
and are therefore successors to the agreement or were intended to be covered 
by the agreement when it was originally entered into with Sandy City. 
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10. On October 23, 1987, Bell Mountain Corporation transferred by Warranty Deed to Longview 
Development, a Utah corporation, all of its right, title and interest in and to the remaining 
undeveloped property described in the June 25,1975 Agreement as the "Horman properties." This 
Deed does not mention the 1975 Contract, and the 1975 Contract was not recorded with the Salt 
Lake County recorders office. 
11. In 1987, Bell Mountain wound up its corporate affairs, paid its creditors, filed its final tax returns 
and did not engage in any further business activity. 
12. Bell Mountain was last renewed with the Utah Department of Commerce on August 17,1992. 
13. Thereafter, on November 1,1993, Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved pursuant to statute, 
and no application for reinstatement was filed within the two year period allowed for such action. 
14. At the time of its renewal in 1992, the directors of Bell Mountain were plaintiffs Horman and 
Johnson, as well as non-party Evans. At the time of the administrative dissolution in 1993, Horman 
was the president, Johnson was the vice-president and Evans was the secretary and treasurer. 
15. According to the certified file on Bell Mountain kept by the Utah Department of Commerce, neither 
an articles of dissolution nor apian of dissolution were ever filed with the Department of Commerce 
nor was a liquidation agreement whereby all contracts were assigned to Bell Mountain's successor 
entity ever filed with the Department of Commerce. The last written document contained in the 
official certified file of Bell Mountain Corporation is dated August 2,1989. 
16. During the liquidation and winding up processes of Bell Mountain, the 1975 Contract was not 
assigned. 
a 
17. In 2006, over eleven years after Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved and only after 
Plaintiffs filed this law suit and the City filed a motion to dismiss in this case, Plaintiffs executed 
an assignment of the 1975 Contract by Bell Mountain directly to Plaintiffs.5 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
18. "Generally, unless a plaintiff can recover on a contract as a third-party beneficiary or an assignee, 
only parties to a contract can bring suit under the contract" See Holmes Development LLC v. Cook, 
2002 UT 38; 48 P.3d 895; 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; 2002 Utah LEXIS 64. Plaintiffs were not party 
to the 1975 Contract they sue to enforce, therefore, to have standing to sue Plaintiffs must be 
assignees of Bell Mountain or intended third-party beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract. 
19. Plaintiffs claim they have standmg as successors in interest to Bell Mountain. A dissolved entity 
may only conduct activities "appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs." Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-1405(1), For an enforceable assignment there must be an act or manifestation 
by the assignor indicating the intent to transfer the right to the assignee at the time the corporation 
was in existence.6 With regard to the 2005 assignment to Plaintiffs that was executed by Bell 
Mountain such assignment was not made during Bell Moimtain's existence and therefore was 
5
 The Court notes the Court did not find credible the testimony that their was a past 
assignment from Bell Mountain that could not be located and this 2005 assignment was made to 
substitute that past assignment. 
6
 The Court notes that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that there was an 
act or manifestation by Bell Mountain indicating an intent to transfer its rights in the 1975 
Contract to Longview Development at the time of transferring its assets to Longview 
Development, therefore, there was no intent to assign its interests in the 1975 Contract to 
Longview Development. 
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untimely. In 2005, Bell Mountain was an entity that had been administratively dissolved for over 
eleven years. The winding up of a corporation is not indefinite. The purpose of the liquidation and 
winding up period is to collect its assets, dispose of properties that will not be distributed in kind to 
its shareholders, discharge its liabilities, and to distribute its remaining property among its 
shareholders. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405. IfBell Mountain was still winding up its affairs after 
its administrative dissolution, then for Bell Mountain to continue to act as a legal entity it should 
have applied for reinstatement within two years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422. Since 
Bell Mountain failed to do so, it was no longer a legal entity in 2005 when the assignment was 
executed, therefore, the Court will not give the assignment any legal effect from a dissolved entity 
with no legal capacity. See, e.g. Bio-Tiiist, Inc. V. Division of Corporations, 2003 UT App. 360 
(concluding that the corporation lacked standing because it lacked legal capacity ten years after its 
administrative dissolution to challenge the dissolution). Furthermore, after two years, an 
administratively dissolved entity's name is available for use. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1421(l). 
To allow a dissolved entity to continue liquidating and winding up its affairs after two years could 
create confusion if another entity legally registers to use its name. This case is not a close call. In 
this case, the 2005 assignment was made eleven years after Bell Mountain was dissolved. The Court 
concludes that the 2005 assignment did not constitute a timely liquidating or winding up activity 
because the assignment was made eleven years after Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved. 
To allow an entity to liquidate and wind up its affairs for such a longperiod of time would encourage 
a lack of diligence in the dissolution of a corporation and open the door for a plethora of problems 
with legally registered entities using the same name. Based upon the discussion above, the Court 
10 
concludes that Plaintiffs were not assignees of Bell Mountain. The Court concludes Plaintiffs claim 
that they have standing based upon an assignment fails. 
The existence of a third-party beneficiary status "is determined by examining a written contract." 
American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CO Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). 
"Generally, the rights of a third-party beneficiary are determined by the intentions of the parties to 
the subject contract." Tracy Collins Bankd Ihtstv. Dickamore, 652P.2d 1314,1315 (Utah 1982). 
"The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear." Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382,1386 (Utah 1989). "Athirdparty 
who benefits only incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right to recover under that 
contract." Broadwaterv. Old Republic Sur., 854PM527,537 (Utah 1993). "Ifthe language within 
the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.** 
WebBankv. Am. Gen. AnnuityServ. Corp., 54P.2d 1139 (UI2002)(quotationsomitted). Whether 
a third-party beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written contract In Paragraph 
12 of the 1975 Contract, there were two express third-party beneficiaries, tcHorman properties" and 
the RP Zone lot owners. Even if the Court treats the Plaintiffs as the tcHorman properties" described 
under the 1975 Contract, which this Court need not decide, the intended benefit conferred upon them 
was not for waiver of flood control fees. Rather, the benefit to Horman properties was to "defer 
payment of all water connection fees and charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain 
Corporation and Horman properties." The waiver of flood control fees as part of a connection fee 
11 
was to benefit Bell Mountain and the RP Zone lot owners.7 Paragraph 12 clearly distinguishes 
between Bell Mountain, Horman properties and RP Zone lot owners and the benefit conferred upon 
each. The Court concludes that even if the Plaintiffs are "Horman properties*' under the 1975 
Contract, they were not the intended third-party beneficiary for the waiver of flood control fees. The 
Court concludes that without third-party beneficiary status for the waiver of flood control fees, the 
Plaintiffs lack standing to sue to enforce that portion of the 1975 Contract 
21. Plaintiffs also claim standing based upon the waiver of flood control fees as a covenant that runs 
with the land. For a contractual covenant to run with the land: 
(1) the covenant must touch and concern the land, (2) the covenanting parties 
must intend the covenant to run with the land, (3) there must be privity of 
estate, and (4) the agreement must be in writing. Flying Diamond Oil Cor. 
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 627 (Utah 1989). 
The absence of any of the four elements "prevents a covenant from running with the l ^ ^ ^ ^ | a t 
prnvityafe 623. The first and fourth elements are clearlymet However, the requiredpmvit  df esta^^^^Hig 
because (1) the City was never in the chain of title to the property at issue, and (2) the 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ | o t 
is outside the chain of title because (a) it was not recorded with the County recorder's office, (b) the 
deed whereby Bell Mountain transferred the property did not refer to the 1975 Contract, and (c) the 
deeds in which Longview Development transferred the property to Plaintiffs also failed to refer to 
the 1975 Contract Furthermore, the Plaintiffs failed to meet its burden to show that the intent of the 
7
 The Court notes that whether the parties intended the waiver of flood control fees to be 
limited to the RP Zone lot owners existing at the time of the 1975 Contract or extended to all 
future RP Zone lot owners is not before the Court, therefore, the Court does not address that 
issue. 
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parties that the 1975 Contract or the waiver of flood control fees provision would run with the land. 
The boilerplate language in paragraph 20 of the 1975 Contract that it is binding on both parties, 
their successors and assigns" merely acknowledges that the document is assignable, not that the flood 
control fee waiverwas a covenant that would run with the landbeyond that property being developed 
at the time. The Court concludes that the flood control fee waiver provision was not a covenant 
running with the land, therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim for standing on that basis fails. 
22. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for breach of the 1975 Contract flood control 
fee waiver provision for which they sue to enforce. Without standing, this Court may not grant the 
relief requested by Plaintiffs. 
23. Based upon the Court's decision that the Plaintiffs lack standing, the Court need not address the 
other claims and arguments raised by the parties. 
ORDER 
The Court hereby ORDERS the City to file a Final Judgment and Order for this Court to sign 
within twenty (20) days. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 2009, 
BY THE COURT: 
ROYAL ^ HANSEN ' , 
DISTRICT ^ COmt JUD0E^'' 
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Alta Ridge Development, LLC, all successors in interest of Bell Mountain Corporation 




This agreement entered i n t o t h i s "X Q» «av of U ^ U j ? 1S75 
by and between Sandy C i t y Corporat ion, a municipal corporat ion of .the State of Utah 
here inaf ter c a l l e d SAITDY and B e l l Mountain Corporcc on,, a Utah Corporation herein• 
afuer c a l l e d BELL MOUNTAIN CORPORATION. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Sandy has a need to increase water s torage and production in i t s 
corporate l i m i t s p a r t i c u l a r l y on i t s e a s t s i d e ; and 
WHEREAS, B e l l Mountain Corporation has prev ious ly and. now i s continuing 
t o develop a large t r a c t of land on the eas t side of Sandy; and 
WHEREAS, the Pepperwood Subdiv is ion i s unique among i t s counterpsrts in 
chat i t i s a "private 1 1 s u b d i v i s i o n having development of i t s own s t r e e t s , parks, e t c . ; 
and 
WHEREAS, B e l l Mountain Corporation i s the developer o f . t h e . said MPepp*rwoodn 
»and d e s i r e s to a s s i s t Sandy in ach iev ing i t s goals , regarding water development and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n w h i l e l i k e w i s e developing i t s own p r o p e r t i e s ; 
NOW THEREFORE, for and in cons iderat ion , of the'mutual promises and covenants 
here inaf ter s e t f or th t*he p a r t i e s here to agree as fo l lows: ' 
1. B e l l Mountain Corporation s h a l l design and construct one three mi l l i on 
g a l l o n underground c o n c r e t e water r e s e r v o i r i n the foo t h i l l s of the Pepperwood devel&p-
ment. The sa id r e s e r v o i r s h a l l be designed and cons tructed so as t o meet the standards 
of the Utah S t a t e D i v i s i o n of Health and the City Engineer of Sandy. Such reservoir 
s h a l l and i s hereby guaranteed aga ins t d e f e c t s i n m a t e r i a l , workmanship and design 
for one (1) year a f t e r acceptance by Sandy. Acceptance s h a l l be upon sat i s factory com-
p l e t i o n of r e s e r v o i r . 
2 . B e l l Mountain Corporation upon completion of the aforesaid resarvcir 
s h a l l convey to Sandy by warranty deed the parcel, of property upon which tha reservoir 
Yt 
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ia constructed, Including sufficient area for maintenance and an easement sufficient 
for the ingress and egress of Sandy vehic les . 
3. Bell Mountain Corporation shall also, upon completion of the.aforesaid 
reservoir execute a b i l l" of sale for the-reservoir i t s e l f and covenant that i t U 
free oE any encumbrances. 
4 . Bell.Mountain Corporation sha l l ; when the Sandy Council determine*, 
d r i l l one or more., up to a total of three (3) sixteen ( U ) inch diameter well, in 
the v ic in i ty oE Pepperwood at locations agreed upon by .-the parties hereto. The 
depth of each of the said wells shall not exceed seven hundred (700) feet unless 
mutually agreed upon by both parties . There shall be no obligation en the part of 
Bel l Mountain Corporation to d r i l l any v e i l s beyond a period of five (5) years from 
che date of this agreement. 
5. Sandy sha l l have no .obligation to accept any well drilled unless i t 
i s capable of producing a continuous amount of potable water acceptable to Sandy 
City, but Sandy sha l l have the right to accept any or a l l Qf the said wjll*-. Upon 
acceptance of the w e l l or wells Bell Mountain. Corporation shall' convey clear t i t l e to 
the we l l , well s i t e , and easement for access.hereto to Sandy. 
6. Bell Mountain Corporation .shall use i t s best.efforts to acquire a lot 
in LaRae Estates Subdivision immediately edjacent to the Pepperwood well pond for 
use as an overflow pond. 
7. Sandy sha l l be responsible to acquire a l l necessary building and water 
p e r m i t and l i c e n s e s r e l a t i v e t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t he wa te r r e s e r v o i r and d r i l l -
ing of the wal l s . 
B. Sandy agrees to permit construction of and lease to Bell Mountain 
Corporation a tennis f a c i l i t y on the top of the reservoir.. Said lease shall grant 
ingress and egress pr iv i leges and shall extend for a period of . f i f ty (50) years at 
a coat" of 51-00 per year, payable- in advance. Maintenance of che reservoir and 
V "t 
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and asspc la ted land shv^ill be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Sandy and maintenance of the 
t e n n i s f a c i l i t y s h a l l . b e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Bel l Mountain Corporation or i t s 
a s s i g n s . Provided, however, that the said lease s h a l l be assigned to the homeowners 
a s s o c i a t i o n of Pepper"ood. Said t enn i s f a c i l i t y s h a U be constructed only i f approv-
ed by the a foresa id D i v i s i o n of Health: 
9. Sandy a g r e e s t o pay t o B e l l Mountain Corporation the f ixed sum of 
$300 ,000 as payment foT the r e s e r v o i r , payable as f o l l o w s ! $150,000 to be paid in 
monthly progress payments during the construct ion period and $150,000 to be paid 
from water connect ion revenues aa here and a f t er s e t f or th : Sandy s h a l l re ta in the 
t o t a l amount of water c o n n e c t i o n revenues up to the t o t a l amount of $25,000 plus any 
a d d i t i o n a l funds spent on water l i n e s in Pepperwood. Thereafter Sandy Cicy s h a l l con-
-vey t o B e l l Mountain Corporat ion sums equal .to the water connection- revenues rece ived 
from property owners i n Pepperwood as they connect to the system, and as shal l be d e t -
ermined on a .monthly b a s i s , u n t i l the balance together wi th the i n t e r e s t i s paid in 
."ful l . Said i n t e r e s t s h a l l be charged on the outstanding balance of the ob l iga t ion 
••of Sandy to Be l l Mountain Corporation at a rate of .1% above the prime rate adjusted 
q u a r t e r l y . The prime r a t e s h a l l be determined according to the lending po l i cy of 
Z ions F i r s t Nat ional Bank, which i n s t i t u t i o n i s the lender for Bel l Mountain Corpor-
a t i o n . I t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y agreed that i n t e r e s t on Sandy's o b l i g a t i o n t o B e l l Mountain 
Corporat ion s h a l l not be- charged u n t i l 360 days a f t er completion of the aforesaid 
^reservoir and i t s a c c e p t a n c e by Sandy Ci ty . I t i s further understood that there i s 
not a des ignated time for repayment period but that i t s h a l l be done as connections 
t o the system are made from time to time, :'by the owners of the subdivis ion l o t s , 
provided that Sandy may pay the* e n t i r e balance due at any time without penalty or 
f o r f e i t u r e . 
10. Sandy s h a l l pay to B e l l Mountain Corporation upon acceptance of any of 
the w e l l s mentioned i n f i v e above" the sum»' equal to the actual cost of d r i l l i n g a l l of 
V* 
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the wel ls . IE Sandy accepts none of the wells It nh. l l never the less pay to Bell 
Mountain Corporation the actual cost'of dril l ing involved in the wel ls . Parent .of 
the obligation created hereby concerning the vei ls shall be paid to Bell Mountain 
Corporation as fol lows: Upon the completion of dri l l ing of any given well the 
amount pertaining thereto shal l become fixed and designated as the actual cost there-
of. This provision s h a l l apply both in the case of a "dry h o l e - and a producing well. 
The obligation thus created shal l bear interest-and be payable under the same tern* 
and provisions.as set forth in section nine (9) hereof-.. 
11. Sandy s h a l l pay; a l l pipe cost which includes material cost only and 
not labor, over and above the oc . t of a s i , (6) inch diameter pipe line respecting 
the main and transmission v - t e r line between Pepperwood Phase Two and the proposed 
location of Wasatch Boulevard, as per previous agreements. Sandy shall pay the 
total cost of pipe and labor respecting the water-line between the proposed iocatlon 
of Wasatch Boulevard and the reservoir; provided however, that in the event Bell 
HoaatBla Corporation or i t s a s s i e s - develops prop«cy to th , east of the rt.s.-r.r.V/ 
proposed route of Wasatch Boulevard, Bell Mountain Corporation shall pay a pro-
portionate share of the cost of instal l ing the aforesaid pipeline between Wasatch . 
Boulevard and the r e s e r v o i r . The said reimbursement- shall be equal to the 1975.co.t 
of materials and laboT for that portion of the said pipeline which i s eoual to an 
eight (8) inch l i n e . Respecting a l l other water l ines within the area defined in 
i t e , U , S a n d y ' ^ 1 1 pay for a l l pipe cost being material only and not labor, over 
and above the cost o£ e ight (8) inch diameter pipe, 
' 12. in c o n . l d a r . t i - n of the above mentioned efforts and expenditures c< 
Ull Mountain Corporation, Sandy shall defer payment of a l l water, connection fees 
and charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman 
p r o p « t i e 3 l o c k e d a a s , of ,006 - , . - o f UOOO eouth and south of 10000 south 
• . n t i l such .time as bui lding permits are applied for 1 * the . .dividual owners of the 
4y 
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I o c s contained therein and s h a l l ' r e q u i r e payment from the sa id ind iv idua l owners 
r a t h e r than B e l l Mountain Corporation such fees as may be required s h a l l be charged 
as provided by the then c o v e n a n t . f e e reso lut ion except that with r e l a t i o n to lo ta 
l o c a t e d in the MRP Zone", n e i t h e r B e l l Mountain Corporation nor the owners of the 
s a i d l o t s located in the .Pepperwood Subdivision shal l be required to paynflood 
c o n t r o l fees , l as part o f a connec t ion fee and shal l 'pay only one-hal f of the otherwise 
required "park fee" . 
13 . Sandy s h a l l as agreed some time ago, complete a l l "long" l a t e r a l s 
i n Pepperwood, Phase 2 . The sa id work*to include only connect ing the l a t e r a l s 
t o the main l ine and running them under -the s t r e e t s . No box or yoke sha l l be made 
o r i n s t a l l e d by Sandy but s h a l l ' b e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l l o t owners. I t 
i s agreed that at the complet ion . of a l l long l a t e r a l s Sandy s h a l l a t i t s own cos t and 
expense repair any s t ree t - damage caused by the said i n s t a l l a t i o n of the l a t e r a l s ; 
and s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e for maintenance of the port ions of the s t r e e t damaged-there-
by for a period of one (1) year on ly . 
1 4 . Sandy s h a l l pay to B e l l Mountain Corporation the actual cost of the 
property mentioned i n i tem s i x (6) above upon conveyance of a warranty deed there to 
v e s t i n g fee t i t l e wi thout encumbrance i n Sandy City. 
1 5 . With regard t o cons truct ion of the aforesaid r e s e r v o i r Sandy City 
by i t s City Engineer s h a l l have the power in a d d i t i o n ' t o review and approve the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the s a i d r e s e r v o i r and approve such Items as sand screens , land 
area used for access and f l u s h wpter pond connected with w e l l s . 
16. Upon r e q u e s t , Sandy s h a l l i s s u e to B e l l Mountain Corporation i r r e -
vocab le l e t t e r s a s sur ing an adequate supply of water for the connect ion of 466 homes 
l oca ted wi th in the area descr ibed in item twelve (12) above. 
V? 
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17. That certain agreement between S. M. Horman and Sons 
and Sandy City dared the 31st. day of May, -1974, is hereby receded, 
cancelled and is agreed to have no further force and effect. 
18. That in lieu, of the' said- agreement of May 31, 1974, 
the parties substitute the following stipulations by way.of agreement: 
1. The Horman Well, along with all water rights owned 
b y the Hermans or Bell Mountain Corporation, relating thereto 
as referred to in the said Agreement of May 31, 1974, shall 
b e transferred to.Sandy'City, subject to an Agreement dated 
July 1, 1973, between S. M. Herman and Sons Company and Fly-
ing Diamond Oil Company. 
2. The City will maintain the well pond and associated 
landscaping in an attractive manner and provide wa«r and 
v ™ r ^ t to Bell Mountain Corporation 
electricity for the same at no cost to B e n 
adjacent lot owners or the Pepperwood Homeowners Association. 
Bell Mountain Corporation shall install at its expense a 
fountain in said pond and Sandy City shall supply the water 
for the same and maintain water in the pond as per previous 
agreements. 
3. The real property described > exhibits "A".and "B" 
of the said agreement of May 31, 1974, which exhibits are 
incorporated herein shall be transferred to Sandy City along 
with the easements necessary for proper ingress and egress 
pertaining thereto. 
a* t-hat- in the event, there is 19 It. is understood and agreed that in 
n f .hl_ COntract.an acceptable producing 
not developed under the terms of this contr 





, that Sandy shall cooperate and make every effort to 
effectuate the annexation of the area referred to in Section 12 hereof 
into the Salt Lake Conservancy District. 
20. This agreement is binding upon both parties, their, successor 
and assigns. 
ir 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties'have caused this Agreement to 
be executed this day and year first hereinabove written. 
BELL MOUNTAIN CORPORATION SANDY CITY CORPORATION 
.by 
' C h a r l e s H» Horman, P r e s i d e n t .Dewey C. B l u t h , Mayor 
ATTEST: 
^ ' ^ ^h-^^f 
' ATTEST: 
A r t h u r D. H u n t e r , C i t y Recorder 
7 A 
APPELLANTS Hillcrest Investment, Scandia Investment LLC, Legacy Communities, 
LLC, Charles H. Horman, M. Gordon Johnson, Autumn Ridge Development, LLC, 
Alta Ridge Development, LLC, all successors in interest of Bell Mountain Corporation 
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APPENDIX 4 
If^-^;"^bpogg'§?tiha'tVf^ellf-#&ip£&2JnfGott.or&z±on,_ancr sandy Ci ty enter-
lji^r--ari/a^aeifieni:'%h:erel^' i' /#. '• 
BELT" MOUNTAIN; C6BP6Rftf&)N WOULD' A^SREE- TO . . < 
3U CcraTBl:rkbt't6n©/thr^^^^ concrete* water 
r£servoir/lodated':iJid. the. foothi l l s" of. the $jepperwood developmenti 
rSptft".facliity..^dttid'. :WaWlgned-.by Horinan'Construction Co. and wdiild 
:fie constructed v£n':'' 1975'ini cohfanriance'to,Board of Heal th standards;" 
2, m Deed'a j^aifael ;o£vlandi.approved. sby5 Sandys CityV" f o r t h .^ l oca t i dn 
of the *reserV<&^^ parce l ' i'o be deeded a t ' no cos t t o the c i ty* 
3* Attempt: to" adq t i tx^ohe lofc??intbe*taRae :Estates subd iv i s ion 
i n ^ e d i ^ t e l y a^^^ pond . ; • such to be 
iised f o r overflow wate r collect-ion &nd as*a p o s s i b l e second well 
feitei-. 
4 # D r i l l a IS .inch'; diaineterVwell near- t n e e x i s t i n g Pepperwood wei l 
for construction^^6f\aii a u x i l i a ^ p i M p i ^ g - f a c i l i t y . . ^ » • s a id well 
t:6 -be t dr i l l ed a t / a t ime mutually agreed upon by both p a r t i e s ; 
l i ' a . ' Pay BHC ^ l i ^ e d ^ r i c e ^ -^30%000^>ior %he'water s torage , r e se rvo i r* 
jiayabi 'e"as.f©llows: (to"fee* dis'crU'ssed) 
"b. Allow "the Pt/ HoAepvmer1^ Association* to have-exc lus ive use of a 
t e n n i s f a c i l i t y ' ' C o be e rec ted on top. of the / r e se rvo i r ; With inaih~ 
tenaxice'.of t h e i reservoir and associa ted land t o be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of t h e ,City ^ ^ \ m i n t e n a n c e V b f ' t h e t enn is f a c i l i t y t o be t h e 
r ^ s p o n s i b i ^ y ^ f * t h e *: &sfe o c i a t ion ; 
c*:.pay t h e total."cosit of .'water\pij>e. fironi t n e proposed Locat ion ot 
iJa'satsbh Blvdi./to t h e storage^re'seir^bir*.-
2 . tJpOn r e c e i p t of af deed f d r / t h e left- i n LaRae E s t a t e s (p rev ious ly 
r e f e r r e d t o ) , pay BMG i t s * exact cost of acqui r ing s a i d l o t . 
3 . Pay. BMC for d r i l l i n g cos t s assoc ia ted with t h e second w e l l - -
paymSnt.ro be made a s f a l l ows : ( to be d iscussed) 
4* a . Defer aJLl water connect ion and associa ted water charges of t h e 
Be l l Mountain Corp . and Horman p rope r t i e s loca ted east: of 200*0-
£afc't> nor th of 120D0 South.and south of 1D000 South u n t i l water 
ife r equ i red by i n d i v i d u a l l o t owners. <v 
b . Deduct park' f e e s frprft a l l . c i t y assessments on l o t s 
(being a^psivstfe^^rea with i t s own parks)* 
a* Exempt PepperwDod^^01^ the flood maintenance fee (flood^ 
iim~intenance"T^^ 10 year storm i s covered by t h e Pepperwood 
Homeowner1 s Assoc ia t ion* 
5m Complete aj.1 wate r l a t e r a l s i n Pepperwood, Phase I I M 
(Agreed t o by t h e p rev ious a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) . I f DEPOSITION 
| | EXHIBIT 
ACTUAL A'ND ESTIMATED-C0SgS?7PEPFERM3QD. 








Future. Pipe . -,17,000, 
4^io>#aBapeh: Blvd »).• 
?top?.t©" tank Be -,H .-4' 
ptiofc/Lng'' costs ,20^00.0. 
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mms&svsp, = mos^ -Da. s^fe^^^v^s&s^^-^s 
ysn 
S" 
TOTAL. ^ AYMENt^TO^SAiroycITY^ 
lQ25:CGnnectionB'-.=!'Sr;-l7-3^649,i-
.. 887 connect ions- .=?' $ w,7S9'i:3 80"^ ' (^.ijigTe-^wel l i n g s ^ i n g t e^cQp^ 
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Utah Code 
Title 16 Corporations 
Chapter 1 Qa Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
Section 1405 Effect of dissolution. 
16-10a-1405. Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business 
except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for 
closing the corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of 
dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation. 
Enacted by Chapter 277, 1992 General Session 
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